The arrival of Information Age, with its rapid development of information technology, has provided a wide space for Data Analysis and Mining. Yet growth in this market could be held back by privacy concerns. This paper addresses the problem of secure association rule mining where transactions are distributed across sources. The existing solutions for distributed data(vertical partition and horizontal partition) have high complexity of encryption and incomplete definition of attributes of multiple parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data mining, at its core, is the transformation of large amounts of data into meaningful patterns and rules. As it extracting useful knowledge from large amount of data, data mining technology has been widely studied and applied in various research and commercial field [1] , [2] . Association rules mining is an important technique in it, which is used to discover the implicit relationship between objects from massive data, revealing the hidden association patterns and then assisting in market operation and decision support system. Look at the transaction of a group-buying website. We may find that most of those who buy ''cate'' also buy ''entertainment''. Therefore, ''cate->entertainment'', which means ''buying cate implies buying entertainment'' is one of the candidate rule. Two metrics are defined to measure such a candidate rule: confidence and support. Here confidence means the number of transactions where both ''cate'' and ''entertainment'' are bought divided by the number of transactions where ''cate'' is bought. Support means the number of transactions where ''cate'' and ''entertainment'' are bought divided by the overall number of transactions. A candidate The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiaojiang Du. rule is considered a valid association rule if both its confidence and its support are sufficiently high [3] . This paper is concerned with a category of association rules mining, namely mining of association rules in distributed databases. Go back to the example above, there are two group-buying websites that hold partial transactions, i.e., user i buy ''cate'' in group-buying website A and buy ''entertainment'' in group-buying website B or user j like to buy in group-buying website A while user k like to buy in group-buying website B. Using a key such as userID and date, we can join these two websites to mining the global association rules. Traditionally, all these association rule mining algorithms have been carried out within a centralized model, with all data being gathered into a central site, and algorithms being run against that data [4] .
Privacy concerns arise because there is no fully trusted third party(TTP) [5] . Third parties are often honest and curious, eager to get additional details of users and potentially vulnerable to abuse [6] - [8] . The semi-trusted third party is proposed to fix this problem. In this paper, we study the mining of association rules in distributed datasets using the semi-trusted intermediate server. Neither the server nor the participant have access to other participants' private transactions. Informally, the goal defines a problem of secure multi-party computation. In such problem, there are M participants that hold private transactions((x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x M )), and they wish to securely compute y = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x M ) for some public function f. In this paper, function f is the association rule mining algorithm and M = 2 for simplicity.
To the best of our know, Clifton and his students were the first to study privacy-preserving distributed mining of association rules/frequent itemsets. In [4] , Vaidya and Clifton gave a nice algebraic solution for vertically partitioned data. However, the computational overhead of protocol for the secure computation of union of private subsets is quadratic in the number of transactions. Goldreich pointed out in [9] , generic secure computation protocols are highly expensive for practical purposes. Furthermore, the solution in [10] only works for three parties or more, not for two parties. Desseni study hiding sensitive association rules through suggesting a lattice like graph by declining support degree of frequent item-sets [11] . In particular, many researches have addressed the privacy issues in mining of association rules in various fields [12] - [14] . However, most of these papers are high computation complexity and ignored the background of attackers.
Differential privacy [15] , [16] is one of the privacy protection concepts with strongest theoretical proof in recent years that guarantees the output of an Algorithm is indistinguishable of the change of one individual's data [17] - [20] . Differential privacy add noise to the real output to satisfy the change of one individual is insensitivity to the final noisy output(in our case, the output is the count of frequent items) [21] - [24] . The main advantage of differential privacy attracted the attention of frequent itemsets mining boffins, much researches have been done in this field [25] - [27] . Li and Gan reduce the dimensionality by projecting the data into a lower dimensional space and by truncating the transactions, respectively. Cheng proposed a differential private frequent itemset mining algorithm based on transaction splitting.
In this paper, we propose an alternative protocol for the secure mining of association rules in distributed databases. The proposed protocol improves upon that in [4] , [28] in terms of simplicity and the theory of privacy, broadens the range of 1-frequent itemsets with certain probability. In tradition, the itemsets whose supports are above the minimal support are used as frequent itemsets. However, those itemsets whose support are near the minimal support have simply been abandoned even with a few missing values or abnormal data. Based upon this observation, we add Laplace noise into the count of each candidate 1-frequent item. In particular, our methods are robust against various attacks model. In this work, we use the intermediate server for data processing and integration without assuming it is safe. The proposed framework is composed of two compositions: (i)association rules discovery under Honest Cooperation(HC) and (ii)association rules discovery under Malicious Spy(MS). In the first case, all of the participants are sincere partners while there could be a malicious participant who collude with the Third-party in the second case. For the latter, the proposed algorithm injects noise in mining of 1-frequent itemsets and construct FP-tree data structure with these noisy value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formally define the problem and give the notations and definitions used throughout this article. Section 3 introduces the overall framework, attack models and then propose corresponded mining algorithms. In Section 4, the performance of our two algorithm are evaluated on multiple experiments. Finally, Section 5 concludes our work.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PRELIMINARIES
Before describing the specific mining of association rules algorithm, we first give the symbols and definitions used in the paper and introduce a reasonable assumption, which will help us to mining association rules in vertically distributed databases with privacy control. According to the previous section, we only use the Third-party without treating it as highly trusted.
Association Rule: We adopt the following standard formulation of association rule mining presented by [11] . Assume that I = i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m is a set of elements, which are called items. The database T = T 1 , T 2 , . . . , Tn consists of a group of transactions, where each transaction T i ∈ T is a set of items(T i ⊆ I ). An association rule is of the form X ⇒ Y if X and Y are a sub category of I and X ∩ Y = ∅. Equation 1-2 show the way of rule support and confidence calculation respectively.
In traditionally, minimum support threshold (MST) and minimum confidence threshold (MCT) are the most applicable criteria to evaluate the value of presented rules, which means X ⇒ Y is valuable if and only if support(X ⇒ Y ) ≥ MST and confidence(X ⇒ Y ) ≥ MCT strictly.
Definition 1 (Distributed Datasets):
We consider our problem with respect to combination distributed datasets means that each party owns some transactions that contains some item of the set I while may has some rows in T . The following example illustrates the form of data owned by parties A and B.
Differential Privacy: Two databases D 1 and D 2 are referred to as neighboring if one can be obtained by adding or removing one tuple from the other, i.e.,
Informally, differential privacy ensures that the outcome should be insensitive to the presence or absence of any particular tuple in D which is bounded by a constant ratio.
Definition 2 ( -Differential Privacy): A randomized mechanism M is -differential private if for all neighboring databases D 1 and D 2 , ∀S ⊆ Range(M )
where the privacy budget controls the amount of noise injection. A smaller enforces a stronger privacy guarantee of M . Laplace mechanism is one of the most general method for preserving -differential privacy of any function F, where the output of F is a vector of numeric data. In fact, the mechanism exploits the global sensitivity of F over any two adjacent datasets, denoted as f . Given f , the Laplace mechanism ensures -differential privacy by injecting noise η into each value in the output of F(D), where η fetch its value from Laplace distribution with zero mean and scale f / .
Definition 3 (Global Sensitivity):
The global sensitivity of a query function f is defined as
where D 1 and D 2 are neighboring databases. One nice property of differential privacy is that it is composable. Specifically, if the domain of input records is partitioned into disjoint sets, independent of the actual data, and the restrictions of the input data to each part are subjected to differential private analysis, the ultimate privacy guarantee depends only on the worst of the guarantees of each analysis, not the sum [29] .
Assume 1: Frequent itemsets can be expanded softly.
Assuming that the frequency of X is K and the support(X ) < MST . However, support(X ) ≥ MST is satisfied when K = K + 1. In this case, the traditional rigid standards will filter out this item X though minimal difference. In reality, data loss or corruption even delay on data acquisition that can cause such error. In this paper, we soften the criteria so that some candidates with minimal difference have the chance to be frequent.
FP-tree is a compressed representation of the input data. It is constructed by reading the dataset one transaction at a time and mapping each transaction onto a path in the FP-tree structure. As different transactions can have same items, their paths may overlap. The steps of FP-tree structure is as follows:
Meanwhile this mechanism satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof:
III. FRAMEWORK AND MINING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present the overall framework of secure mining of association rules in distributed datasets and proposed two discovery algorithm of getting 1-frequent itemsets safely under two attack models. We use the intermediate server for data consolidation without assuming it is safe. Besides, no one in our framework is assumed to be trusted. For simplicity, at this point we only discuss two-party distributed mining, suppose that the two parties are A and B. Definition 5 (Attack Models): In the principles introduced earlier, no party in this system is fully trusted, so that data(even count) should be securely transfered. In this section, we present two secure mining of 1-frequent itemset algorithms for two attack models called Honest Cooperation(HC) and Malicious Spy(MS). In HC model, both A and B are honest and eager to share each other's data securely to learn more accurate association rules. However, in MS model, A and B don't trust each other and maybe a malicious spy who collaborates with the third-party to grab the private data of another. In both attack models, we assume that the attacker has the strongest background knowledge.
A. OVERALL FRAMEWORK
We present the design of the proposed association rules mining algorithm, the overview framework is shown in Figure 1 which contains two compositions: Association Rules Mining Under HC(ARHC) and Association Rules Mining Under MS(ARMS). In ARHC model, the Third-party generates some initialized data and sends it to A, A calculate the result of its private dataset and permutes it by certain rules and then sum with the initialized data from the Third-party, then sends the result and permutation rules to B. B calculate the result of its private dataset and do the same permutation. Finally, B sends the end result to the Third-party. Since the count number of each item or pattern is real value, this mining algorithm is lossless.
In ARMS model, the Third-party do the same operations to send some initialized data to A, A adds laplace noise to real statistical results of each candidate 1-frequent item and use these noisy counts as the node value of noisy FP-tree, and then sends noisy FP-tree to B. Since B also distrust A or the Third-party, he adds noise to his count of each 1-frequent item and use A's noisy FP-tree to generate the final noisy FP-tree. The Third-party can work out all candidate patterns in this noisy tree without access each party's private dataset.
B. ASSOCIATION RULES MINING UNDER HC(ARHC)
Recall that, in the problem of mining 1-Frequent itemset under HC, I = i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m is a set of items. A has a private dataset T A = T i , T i+1 , . . . , TM and B has a private dataset T B = T j , T j+1 , . . . , TN , where T k is a transaction and there may be overlap between T A and T B .
1) MINING OF 1-FREQUENT ITEMSET
The steps to mining 1-Frequent itemset under HC model are as follow:
(1) The Third-party generates an m-dimension vector C = c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m randomly and each column represents the count of a item, then sends vector C to A.
(2) A counts the number of each item according to its own private dataset, and generates the m-dimension vector A = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m firstly. Then, permutes this vector to get a new m-dimension vector A = a i , a j , . . . , a k and record the index of each item. Finally, sum vector C and A aŝ A = c 1 + a i , c 2 + a j , . . . , c m + a k , then sendÂ and the permutation rule to B.
(3) B counts the number of each item according to its own private dataset and permutes this vector according to the Privacy Analysis Since the m-dimension vector that B received is the sum of vector A and vector C of the third party, the true statistical result of A is not disclosed. Similarly, the m-dimension vector that Third-party received is the sum of A and B, the true result of B is not exposed.
Secondly, A and B use the same permutation method. The Third-party can get the final statistics of each index but cannot know the real item represented by the index value.
Algorithm Association Rules Mining Under HC
Input: R.add(a i → a j ); 14.return R;
2) MINING OF FREQUENT ITEMSET Defined in the above section, A has a private dataset T A = T i , T i+1 , . . . , TM and B has a private dataset T B = T j , T j+1 , . . . , TN . In this section, we extend the definitions of A and B as:
where T u i is the transaction of user u i and there may also be overlap (same user) between T A and T B . Since A and B are both vertically and horizontally partitioned, mining of frequent itemset should be considered separately. First, we need to get the common user between them. Mining of common user U : A and B use the same encryption method to encrypt the users identity in their private dataset and then send them to the Third-party, who compares and returns the same ciphertext. For the common user U , both A and B transactions should be considered when mining of association rules, and not vice versa.
The steps to mining association rules under HC model are as follow:
(1) Sort by the frequency of the 1-frequent items obtained in the previous section represented as R.
(2) The Third-party generates m transactions T C = T u 1 , T u 2 , . . . , T u m of non-common users and for each i ∈ I , Rank i = R i |i ∈ T C where u i / ∈ U and Rank i is the order of item i.
(3) The Third-party generates |U | × |I | boolean matrix D C randomly and then send T C and D C to A.
(4) A divides the private dataset horizontally and extracts the transaction set of non-common users as T A . A generates the FP-tree Tree A according to the rank R, where i ∈ T A ∪ T C .
(5) A extracts the transaction set of common users and generates |U |×|I | boolean matrix D A . Each row of the matrix corresponds to a transaction, while each column corresponds to an item. A matrix element D(i; j) is 1 if the ith transaction T i contains the jth item I j , and it is 0 otherwise. Then transpose the rows and columns of the matrix following certain regulations and do OR operation with each of the entries in matrix D C then get the result as D A . Finally, sends transposition regulations and D A and Tree A to B. 
Privacy Analysis
Since the |U | × |I | boolean matrix D A that B received is the OR operation of matrix A and matrix C of the Thirdparty, the Tree A that B received is the unit of transactions T A and T C . The true common users' statistical result or non-common users' statistical result of A is not disclosed. Similarly, the final result that Third-party received is the sum of A and B or the OR of A and B, the true result of B is not exposed.
Secondly, A and B use the same permutation method. The Third-party can get the final statistics of each index but cannot know the real item represented by the index value same as the above section.
Complexity Analysis Computational Overhead FP-tree algorithm needs to scan the database for only twice and avoid a mass of candidate generation, which improves the efficiency of traditional association rules mining algorithm (Apriori). Besides, the process of generating FP-tree can be distributed between A and B synchronously, which can further reduce the calculation time.
For A or B, the matrix representation of the common user can be obtained in the first scan, and the transposition operation and OR operation can be performed in linear time.
The distributed system is not applicable to mining association rules of common users, and the encrypted matrix representation of A and B needs to be perform in sequential implementation.
Communication Overhead For FP-tree construction of non-common users, the Third-party sends initialize transactions set T C , which length is |T C |. Besides, there are M − 1 rounds of communication, where in each one of them each of the M parties sends to the next party a message. In this paper, there are two user and a Third-party, so the rounds is two and the message is a FP-tree.
For common users, there are three rounds of communication between two user and a Third-party, which length is |U | × |I |.
C. ASSOCIATION RULES MINING UNDER MS(ARMS)
Recall that, in the problem of mining 1-Frequent itemset under MS, party A and B have its own private datasets T A and T B same as the above section and there may be overlap between T A and T B . In the MS model, there maybe a spy in party A and B who collude with the Third-party to usurp the private data of another party. We assume A or B distrust each other and there maybe a spy between them. where count i = c i A + Lap A ( ) + c i B + lap B ( ), thus we can figure out the expectation according to the joint probability density function. λ is the threshold of expectation value which balance the granularity of frequent patterns. In this article, we assume that A and B distrust each other and add noise to their private count value respectively. While, there maybe some smart tricks like game theory or adding noise hierarchically can reduce the noise which will considered in later paper.
1) MINING OF 1-FREQUENT ITEMSET
The steps to mining 1-Frequent itemset under MS model are as follow:
(1) The Third-party generates an m-dimension vector C = c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m randomly and each column represents the count of a item, then sends vector C to A. R.add(a i → a j ); 14.return R;
(2) A counts the number of each item according to its own private dataset, and generates the m-dimension vector A = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m firstly. Then, add laplace noise(Lap( f / )) in each dimension where f = 1 to generate the new noisy m-dimension vector A n = a 1 + 1 , a 2 + 2 , . . . , a m + m . Finally, sum vector C and A n asÂ = c 1 + a 1 + 1 , c 2 + a 2 + 2 , . . . , c m + a m + m , then sendÂ to B. The permutation is useless if B colluded with the Third-party.
(3) B counts the number of each item according to its own private dataset and add laplace noise(Lap( f / )) in each dimension where f = 1 to generate the new noisy m-dimension vector B n = b 1 + 1 , b 2 + 2 , . . . , b m + m , and then sum vectorÂ and B n as:
and then sendB to the Third-party. (4) The Third-party received the m-dimension vectorB and minus the vector initialized C. The noisy m-dimension vector of A and B is received. Given a probability thresh-
, T is the total number of transactions, and obey the Laplace distribution.
Privacy And Utility Analysis Since the m-dimension vector that B and C gotten is a noisy m-dimension vector. After adding noise((Lap( f / ))) to real statistics of each item, -differential privacy is satisfied. Secondly, we use the expectation of noise as the method to calculate the support of frequent items. For the item with minimum difference, it can be output as frequent with a probability.
2) MINING OF FREQUENT ITEMSET
Since noise has been added to the statistics of 1-frequent items in private dataset of A or B in the previous section, which is the value of the node in FP-Tree and the statistics of association rules of multi-items are also noisy, the association rules of common users is not considered in this section.
Loss Function of FP-Tree: Given two FP-Trees T A and T B , the loss function is the quantification of the difference between these two trees. The difference between two trees is the sum of the differences of every two nodes under each branch.
Optimal generation of FP-Tree:Given the real FP-Tree and the noisy count of each 1-frequent item, the count of nodes with the same name is same as that of frequent items after adding noise. On this basis, satisfying minimum difference as:
where τ is the set of all branches of A's FP-Tree, (n i , n j ) is the count difference of node i and j in branch b between T A and T B and λ is the hyper-parameter to measure the degree of difference. The optimal generation of noisy tree is a NP-hard problem. In this paper, greedy algorithm is used to reconstruct FP-Tree from the minimum frequent item to achieve local optimization. Figure 2 shows the example of generating the noisy FP-Tree. The steps to mining association rules under MS model are as follow:
(2) The Third-party generates m transactions T C = T u1 , T u2 , . . . , T um and for each i ∈ I , Rank i = R i |i ∈ T C where ui / ∈ U and Rank i is the order of item i. Then sends T C to A.
(3) The noisy count of each item of A is c i . Then A generates the FP-Tree Tree A according to the rank R, where i ∈ T A . For each node name A i of FP-Tree Tree A , compare the count of A i and noisy value c i . If count A i > c i , the pruning strategy is used. Otherwise, the FP-Tree should be extended appropriately.
(4) A generates optimal FP-Tree Tree A on the basis of Tree A satisfying L min , where i ∈ T A ∪T C and sends FP−Tree A to B.
(5) B do the similar operations and generates optimal FP-Tree FP − Tree B on the basis of FP − Tree A according to the rank R, where i ∈ T A ∪ T C ∪ T B .
(6) The Third-party received the FP-Tree FP − Tree B and subtract the branch that initializes in the transaction set T C to get the FP-Tree of all users' transactions. where ''calculate upward'' means only consider the patterns between node i and its parent and ancestor nodes, and ''calculate downward'' indicates only consider the patterns between node i and its child and grandchild nodes. Privacy Analysis Since the count of each 1-frequent item is noisy obtained by the above section and the FP-Tree generated is based on these noisy value, the final noisy FP-Tree is robust even if the attacker has the strongest background knowledge. Complexity Analysis Computational Overhead The greedy noisy FP-Tree generation algorithm need to scan the database for only twice and generate FP-Tree in the order of R. Besides, for each 1-frequent item where the noise is not 0, the algorithm finds the minimum loss branch that contains the item which costs linear time.
As the final FP-Tree is noisy, vertical partitioning of common user attributes is not considered in this section, which can further reducing the computational overhead.
Communication Overhead For FP-Tree construction of users, the Third-party send initialize transactions set T C , which length is |T C |. Besides, there are M − 1 rounds of communication, where in each one of them each of the M parties sends to the next party a message. In this paper, there are two user and a Third-party, so the rounds is two and the message is a FP-Tree.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm ARHC and ARMS on a variety of synthetic dataset based on the real transaction datasets. The datasets used in the experiments are described in Table 1 . All experiments are conducted on an Intel(R) 2.5GHz machine with 8G of 
Algorithm Greedy Noisy FP-Tree Generation Algorithm
Input: noisy count of each 1-frequent item c i , the FP-Tree of A Tree A , the sorted frequent item list R; Output: noisy FP-Tree Tree A ; 1.Sort R in descending order, named as R ; 2.for each i in 1-frequent items do: 3. compare the noisy count of each 1-frequent item c and real value c;
increasing the value of the optimal node satisfying L min (−i) that calculate upward; 6. else 7.
pruning the optimal node satisfying L min (−i) that calculate downward; 8.return noisy FP-Tree Tree A physical memory. To obtain an average performance estimate, each experiment was run 10 times. To compare the performance of the algorithms, we employ F score and Relative error(RE) as measures of utility. DEFINITION 5 (F Score). Let F andF be the set of correct and published association rules, respectively. The F score is defined as follows:
where precision = TP TP+FP and recall = TP TP+FN .
Definition 6 (Relative Error):
The relative error of published frequent pattern setF is defined as
where σ (X ) is the real frequency of pattern X and theσ (X ) is the noisy frequency of the pattern X [25] . Figure 4 shows the execution times for the two datasets by increasing values of minimum support under HC. The minimum confidence was set to 0.6 and we run the experiments with data transmission time and computing time respectively. These results are indicated as ''transfer'' and ''calculate'' and ''total'' in the figure. The execution times increase as the minimum support threshold(MST) is reduced because the total number of large and candidate itemsets increase. Also, as the average length of transactions increase, the number of large and candidate itemsets also increase. Figure 5 shows the F scores for the two datasets by increasing values of under MS. The minimum confidence was set to 0.6 and we run the experiments setting different minimum support threshold(MST). Observe that the proposed algorithm shows stable performance for different privacy budget and MST . The F scores rapidly increase at lower privacy levels(larger ). As the value of is increased, the F scores started to level off because the influence of noise has waned. Also, as the minimum support threshold(MST) increased, the higher F scores is imposed. Figure 6 describes the change of RE on different values of . The minimum confidence was also set to 0.6 and we run the experiments setting different minimum support threshold(MST). The RE decrease as is increased because of the less noise. Also, as the minimum support threshold(MST) increased, the lower RE is imposed because the count of each candidate itemsets is increased and the influence of noise has waned.
V. CONCLUSION
we have proposed two algorithms for mining association rules under HC and MS attack models. The mining algorithm under HC transfer the statistics of more than one participants and the mining algorithm under MS is in a differentially private way. Each party enables the algorithm to use the remaining privacy budget to efficiently and effectively built a differentially private FP-tree with the noisy counts of 1-frequent itemset. Then the Third-party and other participants can calculate the supports of all frequent patterns without access the private dataset.
In this paper, we assume participant have no idea of each party's background and generate the noisy FP-tree in a differentially private way. We believe that taking advantage of the theory of game or generating the noisy FP-tree hierarchically are likely to enhance the performance.
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